Prof. Dr. Florian Hoffmann

Junior Professor

E-Mail: fhoffmann(at)
Telefon: +49 228 73 9220
Standort: Institute for Economics
Institute: Department of Economics
Forschungsbereich: Research Area I
Geburtsdatum: 02.Feb 1981

Academic Career


PhD in Economics (summa cum laude), Goethe University Frankfurt

2010 - 2011

Visiting researcher, Princeton University, Bendheim Center for Finance, NJ, USA

2011 - 2014

Postdoc, Goethe University Frankfurt

Since 2014

Junior Professor of Economics, University of Bonn

Research Profile

My research focusses on dynamic incentive problems and strategic information disclosure, with applications to corporate finance, industrial organization and regulation. A large part of my research is concerned with the structure of optimal long-term contracts in repeated principal-agent relationships. Here I have analyzed a class of continuous-time hidden-action setups in which it is optimal to tie the agent’s compensation to observable and purely exogenous shocks. Further, I have worked on how to optimally structure incentives in dynamic multi-task settings, and in models with persistent moral hazard, where the agent’s actions have long-lasting, not immediately observable effects. The other main part of my research considers problems of strategic disclosure of horizontal match information. Here I have worked on (i) the optimal use of information as a tool for price discrimination, (ii) the privately and socially optimal provision of contract cancellation rights in market environments with consumer experimentation and (iii) equilibrium persuasion through selective disclosure.

In future research I plan to study the economic forces shaping the strategic disclosure of private information over time, i.e., how strategic senders, such as firms or political campaigners, optimally manage the flow of information to receivers, like consumers or voters, in order to achieve their goals, such as increasing sales or winning elections. In particular, I seek to identify the inefficiencies that strategically delayed information disclosure involves, to determine the value of committing to an optimal disclosure strategy and to analyze the scope for regulatory intervention. Further, I plan to study optimal contracts in repeated moral hazard problems when the agent cannot be incentivized using monetary payments, as is e.g. the case in local politics, honorary office or non-profit organizations. Moreover, I am also planning to extend my current work on persistent moral hazard by adding financial contracting frictions. This would allow to analyze whether the optimality of debt extends to such a dynamic setting and to develop a theory of optimal debt maturity.

Selected Publications

[1] Florian Hoffmann, Sebastian Pfeil
Reward for Luck in a Dynamic Agency Model
Review of Financial Studies , 23: (9): 3329-3345
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhq062
[2] Florian Hoffmann, Roman Inderst
Pre-sale information
J. Econom. Theory , 146: (6): 2333--2355
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.10.009
[3] Florian Hoffmann, Roman Inderst, Ulf Moslener
Taxing externalities under financing constraints
The Economic Journal : n/a--n/a
DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12396

Publication List

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