# Selected Publications of Research Area I

[I:DHK+11] M. Dufwenberg, P. Heidhues, G. Kirchsteiger, F. Riedel, and J. Sobel. Otherregarding preferences in general equilibrium. Review of Economic Studies, 78(2):640–666, 2011.

[I:KR11] N. Klein and S. Rady. Negatively correlated bandits. Review of Economic Studies, 78(2):693–732, 2011.

[I:KS11] D. Krähmer and R. Strausz. Procurement contracts with pre-project planning. Review of Economic Studies, 78(3):1015–1041, 2011.

[I:NPR11] V. Nocke, M. Peitz, and F. Rosar. Advance-purchase discounts as a price discrimination device. Journal of Economic Theory, 146(1):141–162, 2011.

[I:GH10] A. Gizatulina and M. Hellwig. Informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents. Journal of Economic Theory, 145(6):2260–2281, 2010.

[I:HK10] P. Heidhues and B. Köszegi. Exploiting naivete about self-control in the credit market. American Economic Review, 100(5):2279–2303, 2010.

[I:Hel10] M. Hellwig. Incentive problems with hidden characteristics: A unified approach. Econometrica, 78(4):1201–1237, 2010.

[I:HMW10] F. Herweg, D. Müller, and P. Weinschenk. Binary payment schemes: Moral hazard and loss aversion. American Economic Review, 100(5):2451–2477, 2010.

[I:KM10] E. Kovac and T. Mylovanov. Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: The regular case. Journal of Economic Theory, 144(4):1373–1395, 2010.

[I:Wes10] A. Westkamp. Market structure and matching with contracts. Journal of Economic Theory, 145:1724–1738, 2010.

[I:BHR09] S. Bade, G. Haeringer, and L. Renou. Bilateral commitment. Journal of Economic Theory, 144:1817–1831, 2009.

[I:BBS09] P. Beaudry, C. Blackorby, and D. Szalay. Taxes and employment subsidies in optimal redistribution programs. American Economic Review, 99(1):216–242, 2009.

[I:GTZ09] R. Garratt, T. Tröger, and C. Zheng. Collusion via resale. Econometrica, 77:1095–1136, 2009.

[I:GLS09] A. Gershkov, J. Li, and P. Schweinzer. Efficient tournaments within teams. The RAND Journal of Economics, 40(1):103–119, 2009.

[I:GM09] A. Gershkov and B. Moldovanu. Learning about the future and dynamic efficiency. American Economic Review, 99(4):1576–1588, 2009.

[I:HMS09] H. Hoppe, B. Moldovanu, and A. Sela. The theory of assortative matching based on costly signals. Review of Economic Studies, 76(1):253–281, 2009.

[I:Ohl09] S. Ohlendorf. Expectation damages, divisible contracts, and bilateral investment. American Economic Review, 99(4):1608–1618, 2009.

[I:Rie09] F. Riedel. Optimal stopping with multiple priors. Econometrica, 77:857–908, 2009.

[I:Zap08] A. Zapechelnyuk. Better reply dynamics with bounded recall. Mathematics of Operations Research, 33:869–879, 2008.