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| 1998 | Diploma in Mathematics, HU Berlin | | 1999 | Master's Economics, University College London, England, UK | | 2003 | Dr. rer. pol., FU Berlin | | 2003 - 2004 | Postdoctoral Fellow, University College London, England, UK | | 2004 - 2008 | Research Fellow, Institute for Microeconomic Theory, FU Berlin (Research grant SFB/TR 15) | | 2008 - 2011 | Associate Professor of Economics (W2, Bonn Junior Fellow), University of Bonn | | Since 2011 | Professor of Economics (W3), University of Bonn |
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One of my current research interests is the relation between dynamic and static models of monopolistic screening. While static screening models have been applied in ubiquitous contexts from regulation to public procurement and price discrimination, dynamic models can explain, for example, the widespread use of option contracts in various settings. In the simplest dynamic screening model, there is a single buyer who has private ex ante information in the form of beliefs about his valuation for the good, but (privately) learns his true valuation only ex post, after he has signed the sales contract. We show that this model corresponds literally to the standard principal agent textbook model where the buyer has perfect private information ex ante. Key in establishing the connection between the sequential and the static model is to explicitly allow for the use of stochastic contracts in the static model. Intuitively, stochastic contracts enter the picture, because in the sequential model the terms of trade depend on the buyer’s valuation that realizes ex post and are, from an ex ante perspective, therefore stochastic. The equivalence result allows us to provide new results for sequential screening by applying well-known insights from the static screening model.
One of my future research topics will be information design resp. disclosure in mechanism design. In many settings, a designer, e.g. an auctioneer, can provide and fine-tune the extent of payoff-relevant information that agents (bidders) have access to and which refines their private information. In many contexts, a designer cannot fully control the agents' information. One important and natural constraint is that an agent cannot be provided with information about the valuation of the other agents. In other words, the designer cannot affect an agent's first order beliefs about the true valuation of the other agents. A designer can, however, affect an agent's (second order) beliefs about what the other agent believe about their own valuation. E.g., the designer can inform an agent about whether he disclosed more or less precise information to the other agents. To the extent that higher order beliefs crucially affect equilibrium outcomes in mechanisms, I intend to study how a designer improve his objective by designing information disclosure procedures that affect higher order beliefs. This may be done in the context of optimal mechanism design, but also within the context of a given mechanism, such as a first price auction.
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DFG Collaborative Research Center SFB/TR 15 “Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems”
Principal Investigator, 2012 – 2015
DFG-Fachkollegiat in the Fachkollegium für Wirtschaftstheorie
since 2016
DFG Collaborative Research Center SFB/TR 224 “Economic Perspectives on Societal Challenges: Equality of Opportunity, Market Regulation, and Financial Stability ”,
Project leader of the project “Consumer protection and competition policy”
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[ 1] Daniel Krähmer, Roland Strausz
Optimal sales contracts with withdrawal rights
Rev. Econ. Stud. , 82: (2): 762--790
2015
DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdv003[ 2] Daniel Krähmer, Roland Strausz
Optimal procurement contracts with pre-project planning
The Review of Economic Studies , 78: : 1015-1041
Publisher: Oxford University Press
2011[ 3] Daniel Krähmer
Optimal auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types
Journal of Economic Theory , 147: : 118-141
2012[ 4] Helmut Bester, Daniel Krähmer
Delegation and Incentives
The RAND Journal of Economics , 39: (3): 664--682
Publisher: Wiley Online Library
2008[ 5] Tilman Börgers, Angel Hernando-Veciana, Daniel Krähmer
When are signals complements or substitutes?
J. Econom. Theory , 148: (1): 165--195
2013
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.012[ 6] Helmut Bester, Daniel Krähmer
Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information
J. Econom. Theory , 147: (5): 1947--1968
2012
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.05.008[ 7] Daniel Krähmer, Roland Strausz
Ex post information rents in sequential screening
Games Econom. Behav. , 90: : 257--273
2015
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.03.003[ 8] Daniel Krähmer, Eugen Kovác
Optimal sequential delegation
J. Econom. Theory , 163: : 849--888
2016
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.03.009[ 9] Daniel Krähmer
Equilibrium learning in simple contests
Games Econom. Behav. , 59: (1): 105--131
2007
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.03.014 |
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| Seminars | | | 2011 | University of Augsburg, University of Mannheim | | 2012 | Carlos III University of Madrid, Paris School of Economics | | 2013 | University of Dortmund, EUI Florence, Yale University, University of Pittsburgh | | 2014 | University of Hamburg, University College London | | 2015 | University of Düsseldorf, Bocconi University | | 2016 | University of Frankfurt, University of Helsinki, University of Tübingen, University of Bielefeld, University of Düsseldorf, University of Mannheim | | 2017 | Toulouse School of Economics, University College London, London School of Economics |
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Stefan Terstiege (2013): “Essays in Contract Theory”,
now Assistant Professor, Maastricht University, Netherlands
Tobias Gamp (2016): “Essays in Behavioral Industrial Organization”,
now Postdoc, University College London, UK
Holger Herbst (2016): “Essays on Dynamic Sales and Matching Mechanisms”,
now Consultant for McKinsey
Bo Chen (2016): “Essays in Applied Microeconomic Theory”,
now Assistant Professor, College of Industrial Management of KFUPM, Saudi Arabia
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- Master theses: 20, currently 4
- Diplom theses: 15, currently 4
- PhD theses: 4, currently 1
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