Profile
Profile

Prof. Dr. Daniel Krähmer

Former Bonn Junior Fellow
Current position: Professor (W3), University of Bonn

E-mail: kraehmer(at)hcm.uni-bonn.de
Phone: +49 228 73 6147
Homepage: https://www.econtheory.uni-bonn.de/de/team/kraehmer/starting-page
Location: Lennéstr. 43
Institute: Department of Economics
Research Area: Research Area I
Date of birth: 02.May 1972
Mathscinet-Number: 807327

Academic Career

1998

Diploma in Mathematics, HU Berlin

1999

Master's Economics, University College London, England, UK

2003

Dr. rer. pol., FU Berlin

2003 - 2004

Postdoctoral Fellow, University College London, England, UK

2004 - 2008

Research Fellow, Institute for Microeconomic Theory, FU Berlin (Research grant SFB/TR 15)

2008 - 2011

Associate Professor of Economics (W2, Bonn Junior Fellow), University of Bonn

Since 2011

Professor of Economics (W3), University of Bonn

Research Profile

One of my current research interests is the relation between dynamic and static models of monopolistic screening. While static screening models have been applied in ubiquitous contexts from regulation to public procurement and price discrimination, dynamic models can explain, for example, the widespread use of option contracts in various settings. In the simplest dynamic screening model, there is a single buyer who has private ex ante information in the form of beliefs about his valuation for the good, but (privately) learns his true valuation only ex post, after he has signed the sales contract. We show that this model corresponds literally to the standard principal agent textbook model where the buyer has perfect private information ex ante. Key in establishing the connection between the sequential and the static model is to explicitly allow for the use of stochastic contracts in the static model. Intuitively, stochastic contracts enter the picture, because in the sequential model the terms of trade depend on the buyer’s valuation that realizes ex post and are, from an ex ante perspective, therefore stochastic. The equivalence result allows us to provide new results for sequential screening by applying well-known insights from the static screening model.

One of my future research topics will be information design resp. disclosure in mechanism design. In many settings, a designer, e.g. an auctioneer, can provide and fine-tune the extent of payoff-relevant information that agents (bidders) have access to and which refines their private information. In many contexts, a designer cannot fully control the agents' information. One important and natural constraint is that an agent cannot be provided with information about the valuation of the other agents. In other words, the designer cannot affect an agent's first order beliefs about the true valuation of the other agents. A designer can, however, affect an agent's (second order) beliefs about what the other agent believe about their own valuation. E.g., the designer can inform an agent about whether he disclosed more or less precise information to the other agents. To the extent that higher order beliefs crucially affect equilibrium outcomes in mechanisms, I intend to study how a designer improve his objective by designing information disclosure procedures that affect higher order beliefs. This may be done in the context of optimal mechanism design, but also within the context of a given mechanism, such as a first price auction.

Research Projects and Activities

DFG Collaborative Research Center SFB/TR 15 “Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems”
Principal Investigator, 2012 – 2015

DFG-Fachkollegiat in the Fachkollegium für Wirtschaftstheorie
since 2016

Contribution to Research Areas

Research Area I
One of my main research interests are dynamic principal agent models where the agent's private information arrives over time. In [1], we consider situations in which the agent has to acquire new information by himself, and show how information acquisition incentives are distorted under the optimal mechanism. In [2], we study the role of ex post participation constraints that arise in online markets with return rights or when the agent has limited liability, and we show that in this case an optimal contract does not elicit the agent's information sequentially. In [3], we study sequential information disclosure incentives, and in [4], we consider a sequential principal agent problem when monetary transfers are infeasible. I am also interested in the optimal allocation of decision rights in organizations when contracts are incomplete. In [5] and [6], we construct an incomplete contract with exit rights that allows the contracting parties to fully overcome frictions entailed by asymmetric information and contractual incompleteness. In [7], we show that delegating authority to subordinates may actually harm their effort incentives. Finally, I am also interested in auction design when bidder valuations are correlated [8].

Selected Publications

[1] Daniel Krähmer, Roland Strausz
Optimal procurement contracts with pre-project planning
The Review of Economic Studies , 78: : 1015-1041
Publisher: Oxford University Press
2011
[2] Daniel Krähmer, Roland Strausz
Optimal sales contracts with withdrawal rights
Rev. Econ. Stud. , 82: (2): 762--790
2015
DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdv003
[3] Daniel Krähmer, Roland Strausz
Ex post information rents in sequential screening
Games Econom. Behav. , 90: : 257--273
2015
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.03.003
[4] Daniel Krähmer, Eugen Ková\v c
Optimal sequential delegation
J. Econom. Theory , 163: : 849--888
2016
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.03.009
[5] Helmut Bester, Daniel Krähmer
Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information
J. Econom. Theory , 147: (5): 1947--1968
2012
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.05.008
[6] Daniel Krähmer, Helmut Bester
The Optimal Allocation of Decision and Exit Rights in Organizations
RAND Journal of Economics
2016
[7] Helmut Bester, Daniel Krahmer
Delegation and Incentives
The RAND Journal of Economics
, 39: (3): 664--682
Publisher: Wiley Online Library
2008
[8] Daniel Krähmer
Optimal auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types
Journal of Economic Theory , 147: : 118-141
2012
[9] Tilman Börgers, Angel Hernando-Veciana, Daniel Krähmer
When are signals complements or substitutes?
J. Econom. Theory , 148: (1): 165--195
2013
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.012
[10] Daniel Krähmer
Equilibrium learning in simple contests
Games Econom. Behav. , 59: (1): 105--131
2007
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.03.014

Publication List

Selected Invited Lectures

Seminars
2011

University of Augsburg, University of Mannheim

2012

Carlos III University of Madrid, Paris School of Economics

2013

University of Dortmund, EUI Florence, Yale University, University of Pittsburgh

2014

University of Hamburg, University College London

2015

University of Düsseldorf, Bocconi University

2016

University of Frankfurt, University of Helsinki, University of Tübingen, University of Bielefeld, University of Düsseldorf, University of Mannheim

2017

Toulouse School of Economics, University College London, London School of Economics

Selected PhD students

Stefan Terstiege (2013): “Essays in Contract Theory”,
now Assistant Professor, Maastricht University, Netherlands

Tobias Gamp (2016): “Essays in Behavioral Industrial Organization”,
now Postdoc, University College London, UK

Holger Herbst (2016): “Essays on Dynamic Sales and Matching Mechanisms”,
now Consultant for McKinsey

Bo Chen (2016): “Essays in Applied Microeconomic Theory”,
now Assistant Professor, College of Industrial Management of KFUPM, Saudi Arabia

Supervised Theses

  • Master theses: 20, currently 4
  • Diplom theses: 15, currently 4
  • PhD theses: 4, currently 1
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