


Dezső Szalay



Academic career

2001	Dr. rer. pol., University of Mannheim
2001 - 2002	Postdoctoral Research Fellow, University of Mannheim
2002 - 2006	Assistant Professor, University of Lausanne, Switzerland
2006 - 2008	Assistant Professor, University of Warwick, England, UK
2008	Associate Professor (tenured), University of Warwick, England, UK
Since 2009	Professor (W3), University of Bonn

Honours

1996	German Research Foundation Scholarship
1998	Swiss Science National Foundation Scholarship
2005	FAME Publication Award
2009	Excellence in Refereeing Award, American Economic Review
2013	Fellow of CEPR (Industrial Organization Programme)

Invited Lectures

2001	WZB Berlin, University of Bonn
2002	University of Munich
2003	ESSET Gerzensee, University College of London
2004	ESSET Gerzensee
2005	Gremaq Toulouse, University of Essex, University of Southampton, University of Warwick, University of Zürich, University of Grenoble
2006	University of Warwick, University of Frankfurt
2007	Universities of Basel, Zürich, Oxford, St. Gallen, University College of London, Max Planck Institute Bonn, ESSET Gerzensee
2008	University of Mannheim, Carlos III University of Madrid, ESSET Gerzensee
2009	HEC Lausanne, London Business School, University of Frankfurt, London School of Economics, ESSET Gerzensee, EIEF Rome, European University Institute Florence
2010	Tinbergen Institute Rotterdam, UPF, University of Maastricht, PSE, Max Planck (Bonn), HECER Helsinki, Warwick, Zürich, University of Minnesota, Kellogg (Northwestern), Oxford, Munich
2011	WZB Berlin, Autonomous University of Barcelona, University of Naples
2013	Dice (Düsseldorf)
2014	Oxford, Copenhagen
2015	PSE
2016	Columbia, Crest (Paris), Zürich, St. Gallen
2017	Cambridge, University of Arizona, UPenn, University of Warwick, University of Southampton

Research profile

I study problems of mechanism design with multiple dimensions of asymmetric information, with endogenous information, or both. In [?] and [?], information is endogenously acquired and then reported. Contracts that induce information acquisition increase the riskiness of choices. In the delegation problem in [?] this is achieved through eliminating compromising choices from an agent's choice set.

In [?], monetary payments are used to this end. In recent projects, we study information acquisition in problems of strategic information transmission.

In the taxation context studied in [?] individuals know their productivities in various jobs while the government does not. Redistribution between individuals of different abilities involves screening some individuals in and others out of the redistribution system. Ongoing work extends the techniques to the problem of technology choice for a regulated producer and to the problem of price discrimination of a multiproduct firm.

Research Area I

The focus of my research is on information acquisition in games with private information. In [?], I have analyzed a communication problem where an agent needs to be given incentives to acquire information and reveal it truthfully thereafter. Due to the absence of money transfers, the optimal mechanism is a delegation mechanism where all the principal can do is to design a choice set from which the agent can choose. The optimal choice set excludes actions around the prior optimal action and thus entails a commitment to activism. In [?] I add monetary transfers and show that the commitment to activism translates into an allocation function that is more risky than for given information. In current work, I analyze information acquisition in games of strategic information transmission allowing for multiple sources of information.

Supervised theses

Diplom theses: 12, currently 3

PhD theses: 7, currently 2

Selected PhD students

João Viera Montez (2007): “Three Essays in Incomplete Contracts”,
now Assistant Professor, London Business School, England, UK

Inga Deimen (2016): “Essays on information and communication in Microeconomic Theory”,
now Postdoc, University of Bonn