


Francesc Dilmé



Academic career

| | |
|-------------|---|
| 2008 - 2013 | PhD Student, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA |
| 2009 - 2012 | Teaching Assistant, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA |
| 2013 | PhD, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA |
| Since 2013 | Junior Professor of Economics (with tenure track), University of Bonn |

Honours

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|------|--|
| 2015 | Excellence in Refereeing Award, American Economic Review |
| 2016 | Distinguished CESifo Affiliate, runner-up |

Invited Lectures

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| 2015 | Main organizer (with Florian Hoffmann) in the Workshop on Dynamic Incentives, Bonn |
| 2016 | Invited presenter at CESifo Area Conference on Applied Microeconomics, Munich |
| 2016 | Lead committee member in the area "Dynamic Games" in EEA-ESEM, Geneva, Switzerland |
| 2016 | Invited presenter at Workshop Decentralized Markets with Informational Asymmetries, Turin, Italy |

Research Projects and Activities

"Forschungstipendium" from German Research Foundation (DFG) to stay 6 months in University of California, Berkeley, for the project "Dynamic Information Revelation"
DFG Collaborative Research Center SFB/TR 224 "Economic Perspectives on Societal Challenges: Equality of Opportunity, Market Regulation, and Financial Stability",
Project leader of the project "Strategic information disclosure"

Research profile

My research analyzes dynamic economic problems with asymmetric information. These range from reputation management by firms or dynamic quality signaling by entrepreneurs to studying deterrence phases after convictions. I also do research on communication, dynamic pricing and cooperative behavior in large societies.

Research Area I The main focus of my research is on studying dynamic problems with asymmetric information, trying to understand in different settings how the dynamics incentives of different agents affect the type and amount of information revealed over time. I have investigated, among other aspects, what signaling value early (voluntary or involuntary) dropouts from education have, [3], or why signaling concerns may induce entrepreneurs to exert inefficiently high managerial effort to signal the value of their firms to potential buyers, [1]. I have also worked on understanding cooperative behavior in large societies from a game-theoretic perspective, establishing that it can be sustained even in the presence of uncooperative agents [2].

Supervised theses

PhD theses currently: 2

Selected publications

- [1] Francesc Dilmé. Noisy signaling in discrete time. *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 68:13 – 25, 2017.
- [2] Francesc Dilmé. Helping behavior in large societies. *International Economic Review*, 57(4):1261–1278, 2016.
- [3] Francesc Dilmé and Fei Li. Dynamic signaling with dropout risk. *American Economic Journal: Microeconomics*, 8(1):57–82, 2016.